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To put the point more bluntly: if the state does not test the 
scientific evidence with which it seeks to convict defendants, it 
should forfeit the right to use it.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the process of establishing a new standard for determining 
the admissibility of scientific evidence under Federal Rule 702, the 
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.2 handed 
down what is perhaps the most important evidence case ever 
decided.3  The Court followed with General Electric Co. v. Joiner4 and 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael5 to make up what is now known as the 
Daubert trilogy. 
One unexpected development has been Daubert’s disparate 
impact in civil and criminal cases.  The notion that expert testimony 
in criminal and civil cases should be treated differently does not 
seem, at least to me, to be a remarkable proposition.  The issues are 
very different.  Instead of worrying about the “hired gun” 
phenomenon as in civil litigation,6 the criminal defense lawyer often 
lacks money for any “gun.”7  Moreover, the causation issues that loom 
so large in toxic tort cases are seldom an issue in criminal 
prosecutions,8 and the termination of the litigation before trial 
 
 1 MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 139 (2001). 
 2 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 3 See United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert has 
become ubiquitous in federal trial courts.”); see also United States v. Barnette, 211 
F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000) (“In Daubert, the Supreme Court radically changed the 
standard for admissibility of scientific testimony.”). 
 4 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 5 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 6 See In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(“[E]xperts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place 
testifying in a court of law.”); see also Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 
644 (7th Cir. 1986) (“There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that 
cannot now be proved by some so-called ‘experts.’”).  For an insightful discussion of 
the “hired gun” problem, see Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 
1113. 
 7 See Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262 
SCI. AM. 46, 50 (1990) (“In DNA cases in Oklahoma and Alabama, . . . the defense 
did not retain any experts, because the presiding judge had refused to authorize 
funds.”).  See generally 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE §§ 4-1 to 4-5(3d ed. 1999) (discussing the right to defense experts). 
 8 Causation is an issue with some crimes, such as homicide, and sometimes the 
medical cause of death is an issue—for example, in a “shaken baby” syndrome case.  
See People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
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through summary judgment is not a concern.9 
What is remarkable about the civil-criminal dichotomy is that 
civil litigants have far greater discovery rights than criminal 
practitioners even though it is well accepted that pretrial disclosure is 
critical.10  Not only are discovery depositions and interrogatories 
unavailable, but a defendant in a death penalty case involving DNA 
can be precluded from seeing an expert’s lab notes before trial.11 
What is also remarkable is that stricter admissibility standards 
would apply in civil cases than in criminal cases.12  It is difficult to 
imagine a federal court in a toxic tort case that would allow a 
plaintiff’s attorney to admit evidence that passed for “science” in a 
recent fingerprint case.  In United States v. Havvard,13 the court 
accepted testimony by a FBI expert that: (1) there is a “zero error” 
rate in fingerprint examinations,14 (2) peer review under Daubert 
means a second examiner looks at the prints,15 and (3) adversarial 
 
 9 See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. OF CIV. JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE 
STANDARDS OF ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT 
DECISION xvi (2002) (“Challenges also increasingly resulted in summary judgment.”). 
 10 The ABA Standards note that the “need for full and fair disclosure is especially 
apparent with respect to scientific proof and the testimony of experts.  This sort of 
evidence is practically impossible for the adversary to test or rebut at trial without an 
advance opportunity to examine it closely.”  Commentary, ABA STANDARDS RELATING 
TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 66 (Approved Draft 1970); see also Paul 
C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 791 
(1991). 
 11 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989); see also Murderer Put 
to Death in Virginia: First U.S. Execution Based on DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, 
at A19 (reporting Spencer’s execution). 
 12 As one commentator has noted, “the heightened standards of dependability 
imposed on expertise proffered in civil cases has continued to expand, but . . . 
expertise proffered by the prosecution in criminal cases has been largely insulated 
from any change in pre-Daubert standards or approach.”  D. Michael Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 
ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000).  This issue is not new.  The first Bush Administration, by 
executive order, imposed high standards for the admissibility of expert testimony in 
civil cases, while federal prosecutors were permitted to argue for lower standards in 
DNA cases.  See Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1993). 
 13 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (stating that fingerprint 
identification satisfies standards announced in Daubert and Kumho; the court 
described this expertise as “the very archetype of reliable expert testimony under 
those standards”), aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 14 Id. at 854 (“The government claims the error rate for the method is zero.”).  
There is an important distinction between not knowing the error rate because 
systematic testing has not been conducted and a zero error rate. 
 15 The court noted that a second qualified fingerprint examiner verified the 
conclusion and thus there was “review” by a “peer.”  Id. at 854 (“In fact, peer review is 
the standard operating procedure among latent print examiners.”).  In contrast, 
peer review under Daubert means the publication of data in “refereed scientific 
 1074 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:1071 
testing is the equivalent of scientific testing.16  How can federal courts 
demand stringent epidemiological studies in toxic tort cases17 and 
then accept such vacuous reasoning in criminal cases? 
Other examples are not hard to find.  Many of the wrongful 
conviction cases involved hair comparison evidence.  In Williamson v. 
Reynolds,18 a district court correctly noted that the hair expert’s 
testimony lacked any scientific support.19  Nevertheless, the Tenth 
Circuit reversed on this issue.20  Williamson was later exonerated by 
DNA profiling, and the hair evidence was shown to be “patently 
 
journals.”  It is a screening mechanism and only the first step, followed by 
publication and then replication by other scientists. “‘Good science’ is a commonly 
accepted term used to describe the scientific community’s system of quality control 
which protects the community and those who rely upon it from unsubstantiated 
scientific analysis.  It mandates that each proposition undergo a rigorous trilogy of 
publication, replication and verification before it is relied upon.”  Brief of Amicus 
Curiae New England Journal of Medicine et al. at 2, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102) (supporting Merrell Dow). 
 16 Havvard found that latent print identification had been “tested” for nearly 100 
years in adversarial proceedings with the highest possible stakes.  In contrast, Daubert-
Kumho requires scientific testing.  The Daubert Court wrote: 
[I]n order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or 
assertion must be derived by the scientific method.  Proposed 
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., “good 
grounds,” based on what is known.  In short, the requirement that an 
expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes a 
standard of evidentiary reliability. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.  General Electric Co. v. Joiner illustrates this point.  That case 
involved a toxic tort issue—whether PCB’s caused small cell lung cancer.  The 
Supreme Court examined epidemiological and animal studies in upholding the trial 
court’s decision to exclude expert testimony.  See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 153-54. 
 17 See Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The 
district court, after finding that the plaintiffs’ evidence was unreliable, noted that 
certain types of other evidence may have been considered reliable, including peer-
reviewed epidemiological literature, a predictable chemical mechanism, general 
acceptance in learned treatises, or a very large number of case reports.”); see also 
Jerome P. Kassierer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for Medical 
Testimony: Disorder in the Courts, 288 JAMA 1382, 1382 (2002) (“In some instances, 
judges have excluded medical testimony on cause-and-effect relationships unless it is 
based on published, peer-reviewed, epidemiologically sound studies, even though 
practitioners rely on other evidence of causality in making clinical decisions, when 
such studies are not available.”). 
 18 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okla. 1995), rev’d on this issue, 110 F.3d 1508, 
1523 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 19 The district court had “been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any 
indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of 
Daubert.”  Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1558.  The court further observed: “Although 
the hair expert may have followed procedures accepted in the community of hair 
experts, the human hair comparison results in this case were, nonetheless, 
scientifically unreliable.”  Id. 
 20 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the due process, not Daubert, 
standard applies in habeas proceedings). 
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unreliable.”21  In Coleman v. Commonwealth,22  another expert testified 
that the chances that a crime scene hair sample could come from 
someone other than the defendant was “possible, but unlikely.”23  
Once again, this statement lacks any empirical basis.  After Coleman’s 
execution, serious questions concerning his guilt were raised.24  The 
same hair expert testified in the same manner at Edward Honeker’s 
trial, and Honeker was later exonerated by DNA.25  Despite all this, 
later cases continued to admit this suspect evidence.26  Indeed, one 
court judicially noticed the reliability of hair evidence,27 implicitly 
finding this fact indisputable.28  There is an embarrassing lack of 
empirical validation for this “well-accepted” technique.29  In a recent 
 
 21 BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 146 (2000). 
 22 307 S.E.2d 864 (Va. 1983). 
 23 See JOHN TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT 51 (1997). 
 24 See id. at 75.  The trial judge was later interviewed about the case: 
Years later, in response to the author’s question about what evidence in 
the case he thought had the most powerful impact on the jury, Judge 
Persin said it was Elmer Gist’s testimony about the comparison of the 
pubic hairs.  It was, Judge Persin observed, the first and only testimony 
that seemed to tie Roger Coleman to the murder. 
Id.; see also Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 867; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Was An Innocent Man 
Executed?, AM. LAW., Dec. 1997, at 40 (“I’d put the odds that Coleman was innocent 
somewhere above fifty-fifty.”; “The state’s hair evidence was shown (after the trial) to 
be far from probative and far from reliable.”).  The Virginia Supreme Court has 
refused to grant media requests for new DNA tests on evidence from Coleman’s trial.  
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 570 S.E.2d 809, 813 (Va. 2002).  The 
Boston Globe, Washington Post, Richmond Times-Dispatch, The Virginian-Pilot, and 
Centurion Ministries—a charitable organization that investigates wrongful conviction 
claims—filed a claim asking that biological evidence in the case be analyzed with 
modern DNA techniques. 
 25 See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE 
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 65 
(1996). 
 26 E.g., State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 44 (Haw. 1997) (“Because the scientific 
principles and procedures underlying hair and fiber evidence are well-established 
and of proven reliability, the evidence in the present case can be treated as ‘technical 
knowledge.’  Thus, an independent reliability determination was unnecessary.”); 
McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997) (observing that hair comparison 
is more a matter of observation by persons with specialized knowledge than a matter 
of scientific principles); McCarty v. State, 904 P.2d 110, 125 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) 
(admitting hair evidence). 
 27 See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 262 (Ky. 1999). 
 28 See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to facts that are not subject to 
reasonable dispute); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 n.11 (“[T]heories that are so 
firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of 
thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Fed. Rule Evid. 201.”). 
 29 See Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 514 (2001) (discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was 
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FBI study comparing the results of microscopic hair examinations 
and mitochondrial DNA analysis, the former were wrong 10% of the 
time—and this was when the conclusion was limited to an 
“association” (“consistent with” testimony).30 
Daubert is now a decade old, and its development and impact is 
the subject of this symposium.  Part II of this article examines the 
transformation of Daubert from a case that most courts and 
commentators believed lowered the barriers to the admissibility of 
scientific evidence to one that a decade later the Court itself would 
describe as establishing an “exacting” standard.31  Part III  reviews 
what I call the Supreme Court’s “criminal” Daubert cases.  Although 
the Daubert trilogy all involve civil litigation, the Court decided several 
cases, both before and after Daubert, that involved expert testimony in 
criminal litigation.  All these cases involved constitutional issues and 
hence are not directly comparable to Daubert, which involved the 
interpretation of a federal statute.32  Moreover, these cases all turn on 
different constitutional rights: cruel and unusual punishment,33 the 
right of confrontation,34 the right to preserve defense evidence,35 and 
the right to present a defense.36  Nevertheless, all involved the use of 
expert testimony, and all raised reliability issues in one form or 
another, and in this respect they share a common theme with Daubert.  
One additional point: the defendant lost in each case, and I will 
argue that in each the Court missed an important opportunity to 
impose the kind of “exacting” standards in criminal prosecutions that 
are now required in civil litigation.37 
 
used to convict the innocent); see also Clive A. Smith & Patrick A. Goodman, Forensic 
Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227, 231 (1996) (“If the purveyors of this dubious science 
cannot do a better job of validating hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic 
hair comparison analysis should be excluded altogether from criminal trials.”). 
 30 Max M. Houch & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial 
DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 964, 966 (2002) (“Of the 80 hairs that were 
microscopically associated, nine comparisons were excluded by mtDNA analysis.”). 
 31 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). 
 32 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (“We interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules 
of Evidence as we would any statute.”). 
 33 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); see infra text accompanying notes 113-
26. 
 34 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985); see infra text accompanying notes 71-
89. 
 35 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); see infra text accompanying notes 
90-112. 
 36 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998); see infra text accompanying 
notes 127-46. 
 37 Compare DIXON & GILL, supra note 9, at xiii (“The rise that took place in both 
the proportion of evidence found unreliable and the proportion of challenged 
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Part IV assesses Daubert’s effect in criminal cases.  Although its 
impact is far less than in civil cases, it is still significant.  Moreover, 
Daubert was only one of several developments that influenced the use 
of expert testimony in criminal prosecutions during the last decade.  
As described in Part V, DNA litigation and scientific evidence abuse 
cases have also played a part.  Part VI sets forth recommendations for 
improving forensic science. 
II.  DAUBERT’S TRANSFORMATION 
A.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. 
In many ways, Daubert was a difficult opinion to interpret even at 
the time it was handed down.  As one commentary observed, 
“[a]stonishingly, all parties expressed satisfaction with the Daubert 
decision—the lawyers for the plaintiff and defense, and scientists who 
wrote amicus briefs.”38  This alone should have raised red flags. 
In particular, some initial reviews questioned whether the 
opinion provided much guidance.  “The catch,” as one commentator 
observed, “is that no one is exactly sure what the new standard is.”39  A 
central question was whether the Supreme Court intended its new 
reliability standard to be more permissive than the Frye “general 
acceptance” test40 that it had rejected.  There is much language in the 
Daubert opinion that pointed in this direction.  For example, the 
Court commented: 
Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a 
specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention “general 
acceptance,” the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye 
is unconvincing.  Frye made “general acceptance” the exclusive 
test for admitting expert scientific testimony.  That austere 
standard, absent from, and incompatible with the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.41 
 
evidence excluded suggests that the standards for admitting evidence have 
tightened.”), with Jennifer L. Goscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 364 
(2002) (“[T]he Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert 
testimony at either the trial or the appellate levels.”). 
 38 Kenneth R. Foster et al., Policy Forum: Science and the Toxic Tort, 261 SCIENCE 
1509, 1614 (1993); see also Bert Black & John A. Singer, From Frye to Daubert: A New 
Test for Scientific Evidence, 1 SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. EVID. Q. 19, 39 (1993) (“Both 
plaintiff and defense lawyers have claimed victory in Daubert.”). 
 39 See David O. Stewart, A New Test: Decision Creates Uncertain Future for Admissibility 
of Expert Testimony, 79 A.B.A. J. 48 (1993). 
 40 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 41 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
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Other passages noted that “[t]he Rule’s basic standard of relevance . . 
. is a liberal one”42 and  “a rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement 
would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and 
their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 
‘opinion’ testimony.”43 
Not surprisingly, a number of courts construed Daubert as 
lowering the admissibility bar.  In Borawick v. Shay,44 the Second 
Circuit wrote that “by loosening the strictures on scientific evidence 
set by Frye, Daubert reinforces the idea that there should be a 
presumption of admissibility of evidence.”45  Similarly, in United States 
v. Bonds,46 the Sixth Circuit explained “that the DNA testimony easily 
meets the more liberal test set out by the Supreme Court in 
Daubert.”47  The polygraph cases also underscore this view.  In United 
States v. Posado,48 the Fifth Circuit stated that “the rationale underlying 
this circuit’s per se rule against admitting polygraph evidence did not 
survive Daubert.”49  Other circuits followed,50 and in this altered 
climate, some district courts admitted polygraph results.51 
Furthermore, the methodology-conclusion distinction that was 
so prominent in Daubert further supported a lax standard of 
admissibility.  The Court wrote: “The focus, of course, must be solely 
on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they 
 
 42 Id. at 587. 
 43 Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).  
There is, of course, language in Daubert that points toward a more exacting standard.  
See supra note 16 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).  Moreover, there is the 
“gatekeeper” language, which also supports a more restrictive view.  Daubert, 509 U.S. 
at 592-93. 
 44 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995) (repressed memory). 
 45 Id. at 610. 
 46 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 47 Id. at 568; see also State v. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 336, 341 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2000) (“Although Frye has been replaced in the federal court system in favor of 
the more lenient standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as set forth in Daubert . . . 
in New Jersey, with the exception of toxic tort litigation, Frye remains the standard.”); 
Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395, 400 n.2 (Pa. 1994) (“Daubert relaxes, 
somewhat, the impediments to admission of novel scientific evidence.”). 
 48 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 49 Id. at 429. 
 50 See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that 
its former per se rule of exclusion is inconsistent with Daubert); see also United States v. 
Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 51 See United States v. Padilla, 908 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (admitting 
polygraph evidence offered by the defense); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 
299 (W.D. La. 1995) (admitting polygraph evidence in a civil case); United States v. 
Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995); United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 
877 (D.N.M. 1995).  See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence Post-Daubert, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1998). 
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generate.”52  Consequently, the trial judge reviews only the expert’s 
methods, not the expert’s conclusion.53 
B.  General Electric Co. v. Joiner 
The Supreme Court’s second case, General Electric Co. v. Joiner,54 
on first reading, would also seem to support the theme of liberal 
admissibility.  The Court ruled that the appellate standard for 
reviewing a trial court’s admissibility decision under Daubert was an 
abuse-of-discretion,55 a standard adopted without even considering 
the principal alternative standard: de novo review.56  The Court’s 
standard suggests that admissibility decisions would not be second 
guessed on appeal—giving the trial court more leeway in admitting 
evidence.  In contrast, a de novo review standard would have given 
appellate courts more authority to control junk science. 
On further inspection, however, several aspects of Joiner caution 
against this reading.  First, the evidence was excluded, not admitted.  
Second, the Court went beyond the question accepted for review and 
applied the standard without remand to the court of appeals.57  
 
 52 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see also State v. Merwin, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (Idaho 
1998) (“Even under the holding in Daubert, the focus of the court’s inquiry is ‘on the 
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.’”). 
 53 See Kenneth J. Cheseboro, Taking Daubert’s “Focus” Seriously: The Methodology/ 
Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994). 
 54 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 55 Id. at 146-47.  The Court wrote: 
We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by 
which to review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude scientific 
evidence.  We further hold that, because it was within the District 
Court’s discretion to conclude that the studies upon which the experts 
relied were not sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to 
support their conclusions that Joiner’s exposure to PCBs contributed 
to his cancer, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding their testimony. 
Id. 
 56 Other courts have taken a different approach to the standard of review issue.  
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n considering the 
issue of scientific validity, our review is de novo because a trial judge’s conclusion will 
have applicability beyond the facts of the case before him.”  Commonwealth v. Vao 
Sok, 683 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Mass. 1997); see also David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of 
Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1997) (arguing for 
de novo review). 
 57 See Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or 
Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 766 (1998) (“Had the Court stopped there and 
remanded the case as defendants had requested, its decision would have been 
uncontroversial.  However, although it had already answered the only question 
presented, the Court went on to hand the defendants a victory greater than they had 
sought.”). 
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Interestingly, the Chief Justice, who in his Daubert concurrence, 
voiced considerable discomfort with the capability of federal judges 
to understand scientific concepts such as “falsifiability” and who was 
concerned that they would be turned into amateur scientists,58 had 
apparently overcome these fears and revealed no hesitation in 
reviewing epidemiological and animal studies in Joiner.  Third, the 
“methodology-conclusion” dichotomy, so critical in Daubert, was 
drawn into question.  The Joiner Court remarked that nothing in 
Daubert “requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is 
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.  A court 
may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between 
the data and the opinion proffered.”59  In other words, the dichotomy 
is not as easy to apply as suggested in Daubert.  Finally, the Court 
commented that “while the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district 
courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than 
would have been admissible under Frye, they leave in place the 
‘gatekeeper’ role of the trial judge in screening such evidence.”60  
The term “somewhat” is riveting.  The language in Daubert (quoted 
above) suggested that a heck of a lot more evidence would be 
admissible under Daubert than under Frye. 
In hindsight, at least, Joiner was a transitional case, moving from 
a liberal standard of admissibility as suggested in Daubert, to an 
exacting standard as noted a decade later.61 
C.  Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael 
Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,62 the third case in the Daubert 
trilogy, removed any doubts about the Court’s intended direction.63  
 
 58 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  The Chief Justice 
commented: 
I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss 
to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a 
theory depends on its “falsifiability,” and I suspect some of them will 
be, too.  I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some 
gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of 
proffered expert testimony.  But I do not think it imposes on them 
either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in 
order to perform that role. 
Id. 
 59 522 U.S. at 146. 
 60 Id. at 142 (emphasis added). 
 61 See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). 
 62 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 63 At the end of the day, the Court had upheld the exclusion of the proffered 
expert testimony in all three cases.  In Daubert, the Court remanded.  On remand, 
the court of appeals again excluded the evidence, and the Supreme Court denied 
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First, the Court extended Daubert’s reliability requirement to 
nonscientific testimony under Rule 702.64  In the aftermath of Daubert, 
litigators quickly understood that they might avoid the Daubert 
reliability requirement by simply relabeling their evidence from 
“scientific” to “technical.”  The Court had to shut this door or 
Daubert’s impact would have been restricted to a narrow category of 
cases. 
Second, the Court acknowledged the relevance of the Daubert 
factors in determining reliability in this context.65  In other words, 
these factors were not limited to “scientific” evidence; they might 
apply to all expert testimony.  This may turn out to be the more 
critical aspect of the case.  Other courts had concluded that the 
reliability requirement applied to nonscientific expert testimony but 
had adopted extremely lenient standards for such evidence.  For 
example, the Hawaii Supreme Court had ruled that: 
because the underlying scientific principles and procedures are of 
proven validity/reliability, it is unnecessary to subject technical 
 
certiorari.  43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995). 
 64 The Court concluded that “Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial 
judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only to testimony based on 
‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other 
specialized’ knowledge.”  Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.  To support its conclusion, the 
Court noted that: (1) Rule 702 did not distinguish between “scientific” knowledge 
and “technical” or “other specialized knowledge”; (2) Daubert’s gatekeeping rationale 
was not limited to scientific knowledge; and (3) “it would prove difficult, if not 
impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping 
obligation depended upon a distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and 
‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”  Id. at 148. 
 65 In determining the admissibility of technical or other specialized knowledge, 
the Court held that the trial court “may consider one or more of the specific factors 
that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony’s 
reliability.”  Id. at 141.  The Court characterized the Daubert inquiry as “flexible” and 
noted: 
[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the 
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so 
for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of 
evidence. . . .  Daubert itself is not to the contrary.  It made clear that its 
list of factors was meant to be helpful, not definitive.  Indeed, those 
factors do not all necessarily apply even in every instance in which the 
reliability of scientific testimony is challenged.  It might not be 
surprising in a particular case, for example, that a claim made by a 
scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for the 
particular application at issue may never previously have interested any 
scientist.  Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of Daubert’s 
general acceptance factor help show that an expert’s testimony is 
reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do 
theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of 
astrology or necromancy. 
Id. at 150-51. 
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knowledge to the same type of full-scale reliability determination 
required for scientific knowledge.  Thus, although technical 
knowledge, like all expert testimony, must be both relevant and 
reliable, its reliability may be presumed.66 
Although the court ruled that technical expert testimony must be 
reliable, it undercut the significance of that ruling by treating 
technical evidence as presumptively admissible.  The court effectively 
shifted the burden of proof on the reliability requirement to the 
opposing party.  Kumho rejected this approach.  Consequently, the 
reliability requirement is not only wide but it is deep. 
The Court confirmed this view in Weisgram v. Marley Co.67 while 
reviewing a summary judgment in a wrongful death action against a 
manufacturer of an allegedly defective baseboard heater.  Although 
expert testimony was involved, the Court was not required to 
elaborate further on the Daubert-Kumho standard.  Nevertheless, the 
Court did remark: “Since Daubert, moreover, parties relying on expert 
evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such 
evidence must meet.”68  Here, the “liberal” standard of the Federal 
Rules has been explicitly replaced by an “exacting” standard.69  As one 
district court observed, the Supreme Court in Daubert and Kumho “is 
plainly inviting a reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’ 
venerable, technical fields.”70 
 
 
 66 State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 43 (Haw. 1997). 
 67 528 U.S. 440 (2000). 
 68 Id. at 455; see also Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993) (“When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient 
facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict 
or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury’s verdict.”). 
 69 See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 553 (D. Md. 2002).  The court 
determined that: 
Under Daubert, therefore, it was expected that it would be easier to 
admit evidence that was the product of new science or technology.  In 
practice, however, it often seems as though the opposite has 
occurred—application of Daubert/Kumho Tire analysis results in the 
exclusion of evidence that might otherwise have been admitted under 
Frye. 
Id.; see also Kassierer & Cecil, supra note 17, at 1383 (“In the Daubert case . . . the 
Supreme Court rejected the deferential standard of the Frye Rule in favor of a more 
assertive standard that required courts to determine that expert testimony was well 
grounded in the methods and procedures of science.”). 
 70 United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999); see also infra notes 
149-60. 
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III.  SUPREME COURT’S CRIMINAL “DAUBERT” CASES 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court decided a number of 
criminal procedure cases dealing with expert evidence between 1983 
and 2000.  Although these cases all involved constitutional issues, I 
argue that reliability concerns are embedded in each and thus a 
rough comparison with Daubert-Kumho is possible. 
A.  Delaware v. Fensterer 
In Delaware v. Fensterer,71 a 1985 decision, the Supreme Court 
considered a confrontation challenge involving the basis of expert 
testimony.  Fensterer was charged with the murder of his live-in 
fiancée whose body was discovered at a shopping center parking lot.  
The prosecution contended that Fensterer had strangled the victim 
in their apartment with a cat leash.  The government’s case rested on 
circumstantial evidence.  Two hairs on the leash were similar to the 
victim’s hair, and an FBI analyst testified that one of the two hairs had 
been “forcibly removed.”  The prosecution argued that the hair had 
been dislodged during the strangulation.  According to the Delaware 
Supreme Court, the expert’s testimony “established the leash as the 
murder weapon” and “[t]he leash belonged to Fensterer and [the 
victim].”72 
The FBI expert testified that there are three methods to 
determine whether hair has been forcibly removed but could not 
remember which method he had used in reaching his conclusion.73  
He testified: “As to the exact manner in which this particular hair was 
forcibly removed, I don’t know.  I have no indication in my notes 
other than the fact it was forcibly removed.”74 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the FBI 
expert’s lack of memory precluded the defense from effectively 
testing the basis for his opinion by cross-examination.  This, the court 
reasoned, violated the accused’s confrontation rights because a 
 
 71 474 U.S. 15 (1985). 
 72 State v. Fensterer, 493 A.2d 959, 964 (Del. 1985). 
 73 The three methods are as follows: (1) The presence of a follicular tag on the 
hair, (2) the presence of an elongated and misshaped root, and (3) the presence of a 
sheath of skin surrounding the root area. 
 74 493 A.2d at 963 (quoting record of trial).  A defense expert vigorously 
challenged the proposition that the presence of a follicular tag indicated forcible 
removal.  He maintained that “scientific authority contradicted” this theory.  Id. at 
964.  The defense expert further testified that he had telephoned the FBI expert who 
had stated that his opinion rested on the “follicular tag” theory.  The defense expert 
testified “that he had spoken by telephone with [the prosecution expert], who 
advised him that his conclusion of forcible removal was based on the presence of the 
follicular tag.”  Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 17. 
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Special Agent from the FBI “can appear to be a highly credible 
person to the average lay jury”75 and effective cross-examination 
depends on the expert’s committing himself to a basis for his 
opinion.  “Without an acknowledgment of the basis of his opinion, 
defense counsel’s cross-examination of the Agent was nothing more 
than an exercise in futility.”76 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed per 
curiam—without briefs or argument.77  According to the Court, “the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, 
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”78  On remand, 
however, the Delaware Supreme Court again held the opinion 
inadmissible but on evidentiary, rather than constitutional, grounds.  
According to that court: “While a witness’s mere lack of memory as to 
a particular fact may go only to the weight of that evidence, an expert 
witness’s inability to establish a sufficient basis for his opinion clearly 
renders the opinion inadmissible under D.R.E. 705.”79 
In a later case, United States v. Owens,80 the United States Supreme 
Court, citing Fensterer, applied the same rationale to a lay witness’s 
memory lapse.81  However, the two cases could have easily been 
 
 75 Fensterer, 493 A.2d at 964. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Justice Marshall dissented “from this summary disposition, which has been 
ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an opportunity to file briefs on 
the merits.”  474 U.S. at 23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun also voted for 
“plenary consideration,” as did Justice Stevens, who referred to the case as “novel.” 
Id. 
 78 Id. at 20.  Later in the opinion the Court returned to this point, writing that 
“the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and 
fair opportunity to probe and expose . . . infirmities through cross-examination, 
thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight 
to the witness’ testimony.”  Id. at 22.  The Court held that a sufficient opportunity was 
provided at trial because the defense counsel’s cross-examination “demonstrated to 
the jury that [the expert] could not even recall the theory on which his opinion was 
based.  Moreover, through its own expert witness, the defense was able to suggest to 
the jury that [the FBI expert] had relied on a theory which the defense expert 
considered baseless.”  Id. at 20. 
 79 Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106, 1109-10 (Del. 1986). 
 80 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
 81 Id. at 559-60.  A hospitalized witness, suffering from a fractured skull, identified 
Owens as his attacker and picked his picture from a photo array.  At trial, the witness 
testified about the attack, including his hospital identification of Owens.  On 
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he could not remember seeing his 
assailant.  The Supreme Court held that the witness’s impaired memory did not 
deprive Owens of the right of cross-examination.  According to the Court, the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination.  This right is satisfied when the defendant has the opportunity to 
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distinguished.  It is one thing to acknowledge that we often can do 
little to prevent memory lapses of lay witnesses (which resulted from a 
severe beating in Owens); it is quite another thing to say the same 
about an expert.  There is no valid reason, legal or scientific, that 
justifies the failure to document forensic analyses.  The American 
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors recommends it,82 as did the 
first DNA report published by the National Academy of Sciences.83 
Contrast Fensterer with Daubert’s language concerning the 
scientific method: “Proposed testimony must be supported by 
appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is 
known.”84  Compare Fensterer with Kumho Tire where the Court wrote: 
“Daubert pointed out that Federal Rules 702 and 703 grant expert 
witnesses testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the 
‘assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the 
knowledge and experience of his discipline.’”85  Is there anything less 
scientific than failing to record test results?86 
 
bring out such matters as a witness’s faulty memory. 
 82 The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD) issued 
guidelines on casework documentation and reporting.  Proper documentation 
requires a system of note keeping that records the basis for any findings, conclusions, 
and interpretations, and the retention of all notes, charts, photographs, or diagrams.  
“The documentation should be such that a knowledgeable analyst or supervisor, in 
the absence of the primary analyst, would be able to evaluate and interpret the data.”  
ASCLD, Guidelines for Forensic Laboratory Management  Practices, 14 CRIME LABORATORY 
DIG. 39, 43 (Apr. 1987).  Competent laboratory reports must include (1) an 
“accurate summary of significant material contained in the case notes,” (2) 
“interpretive information as well as examination results wherever possible,” and (3) 
identification of “the analyst(s) and, if appropriate, the testing methodology.”  Id. 
 83 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 104-05 
(1992) [hereinafter DNA TECHNOLOGY].  The report concluded that: 
The ideal program would contain mechanisms to ensure that: . . . Case 
records—such as notes, worksheets, autoradiographs, and population 
databanks—and other data or records that support examiners’ 
conclusions are prepared, retained by the laboratory, and made 
available for inspection on court order after review of the 
reasonableness of a request. 
Id. 
 84 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
 85 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).  Fensterer can also be 
compared to amended Rule 702, which requires that expert testimony be “based 
upon sufficient facts or data.”  FED. R. EVID. 702(1). 
 86 Georgia Supreme Court Justice George T. Smith criticized the practice as 
follows: 
It is an insult to intelligent people to say that a scientific test was 
conducted from which absolutely no notes or records survive. . . .  A 
basic principle of scientific testing is that careful records of test 
procedure and results are to be scrupulously maintained.  A scientific 
test without an accompanying report of the testing environment, 
number of trials, raw results and analyzed data is in reality no test at all. 
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Moreover, had Fensterer been decided the other way the chief 
beneficiary in the long run may have been the prosecution because 
its experts would have been required to have supporting 
documentation, and perhaps the Inspector General’s 1997 Report on 
the FBI laboratory would not have needed to recommend that 
adequate case files be required.87 
Proper documentation can also preclude a number of abuses.  
The Journal of Forensic Sciences, the official publication of the 
American Academy of Forensic Sciences, published a symposium on 
the ethical responsibilities of forensic scientists in 1989.88  One article 
discussed a number of laboratory reporting practices, including (1) 
“preparation of reports containing minimal information in order not 
to give the ‘other side’ ammunition for cross-examination,” (2) 
“reporting of findings without an interpretation on the assumption 
that if an interpretation is required it can be provided from the 
witness box,” and (3) “[o]mitting some significant point from a 
report to trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner.”89  These practices 
could be curbed, if not eliminated, by the implementation of proper 
documentation requirements. 
B.  Arizona v. Youngblood 
In the 1970s, courts began to extend the Brady doctrine90 to the 
preservation of evidence.91  In addition to due process, the right of 
 
Law v. State, 307 S.E.2d 904, 908 (Ga. 1983) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 87 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE FBI LABORATORY: AN 
INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-
RELATED AND OTHER CASES (1997) [hereinafter FBI LABORATORY].  “The Rudolph 
files and some of Martz’s work underscore the importance of case files containing all 
the documentation necessary for another appropriately qualified examiner to be 
able to understand and replicate the examiner’s data and analysis.  We encountered 
the problem of incomplete or missing documentation in many case files.”  Id., pt. 1, 
at 25. 
 88 Symposium, Ethical Conflicts in the Forensic Sciences, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 717-93 
(1989). 
 89 Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the 
Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989).  Lucas was the Director of the Centre of 
Forensic Sciences for the Ministry of the Solicitor General, Toronto, Ontario. 
 90 In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court recognized the 
prosecution’s constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.  The Court wrote: 
“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  Id. at 87. 
 91 See generally 3 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.5(h) (3d ed. 
1999); Che H. Lee, Comment, The Prosecution’s Duty to Preserve Evidence Before Trial, 72 
CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1984); Comment, Judicial Response to Government Loss or Destruction 
of Evidence, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 542 (1972). 
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preservation may be supported by the compulsory process92 and right 
of confrontation guarantees.93  The right of preservation was 
extensively litigated in scientific evidence cases.  Defendants 
successfully argued that this right had been violated by the 
prosecution’s failure to preserve drugs,94 bullets,95 a fingertip,96 
blood,97 urine,98 and trace metal detection results,99 as well as physical 
evidence of arson,100 rape,101 and homicide.102  Nevertheless, the scope 
of the right remained uncertain. 
In Arizona v. Youngblood,103 the Supreme Court addressed the 
 
 92 See Gov’t of V.I. v. Testamark, 570 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Loss or 
destruction of relevant evidence . . . may also deny a defendant the right to 
compulsory process.”); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 
71, 174-75 n.485 (1974) (“The government’s failure to preserve material evidence in 
the defendant’s favor . . . violates his right of compulsory process because it 
precludes him from effectively producing the evidence in court.”). 
 93 See Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) 
(confrontation right to reexamine incriminatory bullet); People v. Taylor, 369 
N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (confrontation and due process rights to 
preservation of heroin for independent examination). 
 94 E.g., People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267, 273 (Colo. 1983) (failure to preserve 
nondangerous materials used to manufacture drugs violates due process); People v. 
Gomez, 596 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Colo. 1979) (consumption of heroin in unnecessary 
tests violates due process); Stipp v. State, 371 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) 
(consumption of cocaine); People v. Dodsworth, 376 N.E.2d 449, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1978) (consumption of MDMA); People v. Taylor, 369 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1977) (consumption of heroin); Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Ky. 
1984) (consumption of drugs); People v. Wagstaff, 484 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (App. Div. 
1985) (destruction of marijuana). 
 95 See Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). 
 96 See People v. Morgan, 606 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Colo. 1980). 
 97 See People v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293, 297-99 (Colo. 1986); see also People v. 
Garries, 645 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Colo. 1982); State v. Swanson, 722 P.2d 1155, 1158 
(Mont. 1986); State v. Kersting, 623 P.2d 1095, 1103-04 (Or. App. 1981); State v. 
Lovato, 617 P.2d 169, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). 
 98 See People v. Moore, 666 P.2d 419, 423 (Cal. 1983). 
 99 See People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Colo. 1983). 
 100 See State v. Hannah, 583 P.2d 888, 889 (Ariz. 1978) (inadvertent destruction of 
arson evidence violates due process). 
 101 See Hilliard v. Spalding, 719 F.2d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1983) (failure to preserve 
sperm sample); Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 747 (Del. 1983) (failure to preserve 
clothing for blood analysis violates Brady); State v. Havas, 601 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Nev. 
1979) (failure to preserve victim’s clothing required dismissal). 
 102 See People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1985) (vehicle destroyed); see also 
State v. Wright, 557 P.2d 1, 67 (Wash. 1976) (victim’s clothing destroyed); People v. 
Harmes, 560 P.2d 470, 473 (Colo. 1976) (failure to preserve videotape of alleged 
assault violated due process). 
 103 488 U.S. 51 (1988).  In an earlier case, California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 
(1984), the Supreme Court ruled that due process did not require the preservation 
of additional breath samples as part of intoxication testing.  According to the Court: 
Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve 
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issue in a case involving the failure to preserve semen in a sexual 
assault case.  The evidence was critical.104  While bad faith is not a 
requirement in the Brady suppression cases, the Supreme Court 
nevertheless ruled it determinative in a failure to preserve situation.  
The Court added: “The failure of the police to refrigerate the 
clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be 
described as negligent.”105 
Some courts have found “bad faith destruction,”106 while 
 
evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected 
to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.  To meet this 
standard of constitutional materiality, . . . [the] evidence must both 
possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was 
destroyed, and also be of such a nature that the defendant would be 
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available 
means. 
Id. at 488-89.  The Court held that neither of these conditions was satisfied.  Given 
the reliability of the intoxilyzer, “breath samples were much more likely to provide 
inculpatory [rather] than exculpatory evidence.”  Id. at 489.  Moreover, alternative 
methods of attacking intoxilyzer results were available; the defendant had the right 
under state law to inspect the intoxilyzer, the right to introduce evidence to show 
possible interference with the machine’s measurements, and the right to cross-
examine the police concerning operator error.  Id. at 490.  Youngblood differed from 
Trombetta, however.  A serious crime was involved in the former, not a DUI 
prosecution.  Moreover, Youngblood concerned the preservation of evidence already 
in the police’s possession, not the preservation of evidence that the police would not 
ordinarily retain. 
 104 Dissenting, Justice Blackmun wrote: 
But we do know several important things about the evidence.  First, the 
semen samples on the clothing undoubtedly came from the assailant.  
Second, the samples could have been tested, using technology available 
and in use at the local police department, to show either the blood 
type of the assailant, or that the assailant was a nonsecreter, i.e., 
someone who does not secrete a blood-type “marker” into other body 
fluids, such as semen.  Third, the evidence was clearly important.  A 
semen sample in a rape case where identity is questioned is always 
significant.  Fourth, a reasonable police officer should have recognized 
that the clothing required refrigeration.  Fifth, we know that an 
inconclusive test was done on the swab.  The test suggested that the 
assailant was a nonsecreter, although it was equally likely that the 
sample on the swab was too small for accurate results to be obtained.  
And, sixth, we know that respondent is a secreter.  If the samples on 
the clothing had been tested, and the results had shown either the 
blood type of the assailant or that the assailant was a nonsecreter, its 
constitutional materiality would be clear. 
Id. at 68 (citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 105 Id. at 58. 
 106 E.g., United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1994) (Government 
denied defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a defense by intentionally 
disposing of potentially exculpatory and highly probative evidence in the face of 
[defendants’] repeated requests for pretrial access to that evidence”); United States 
v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 932 (9th  Cir. 1993) (bad faith destruction of 
 2003 “CRIMINAL” DAUBERT CASES 1089 
numerous courts have not.107  This is not surprising since the standard 
is a difficult one to satisfy.108  Indeed, the Youngblood approach was so 
out-of-line with notions of basic fairness that an overwhelming 
number of state courts have rejected it as a matter of state 
constitutional law.109  The Alabama Supreme Court, for instance, has 
 
methamphetamine lab equipment violates due process); People v. Walker, 628 
N.E.2d 971, 973 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (determining that destruction of clothing 
satisfies the demanding Youngblood test and finding items that were destroyed within 
six weeks of the crime were based on improper authorization); State v. Jordan, 597 
N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (“[B]y destroying and then substituting 
other evidence and securing indictments based upon it, the police actions in 
themselves constituted a [due process] violation . . . .”). 
 107 E.g., Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Nor did the 
failure to conduct tests on the semen sample violate Villafuerte’s due process rights.  
The record contains no evidence that the semen sample could have had exculpatory 
value which was apparent at the time the officers failed to perform the tests.”); Jones 
v. McCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477-78 (7th Cir. 1992) (failure to preserve non-motile 
sperm); Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1488-89 (9th Cir. 1992) (panties negligently 
lost); United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (crack cocaine lost 
after lab tests); United States v. Sandoval, 913 F. Supp. 494, 497 (S.D. Tex. 1995) 
(“[T]here is no indication . . . that the agents destroyed the marijuana to circumvent 
disclosure requirements or for any other improper motive.”); State v. Baldwin, 618 
A.2d 513, 522 (Conn. 1993) (mistaken destruction of narcotic vials); State v. 
Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Iowa 1992) (routine destruction of blood sample); 
State v. Mabe, 412 S.E.2d 386, 388 (S.C. 1991) (destruction of cocaine). 
 108 See generally Note, The Role of Police Culpability in Leon and Youngblood, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 1213, 1223 n.59 (1990) (“Of course, there is the additional difficulty of proving 
that the police knew the evidence to be exculpatory.  Few officers will be willing to 
admit they destroyed evidence they knew to be exculpatory.”). 
 109 In State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585 (Conn. 1995), the Connecticut Supreme 
Court recognized that: 
Apparently only Arizona and California . . . have concluded that their 
state charters offer the same limited degree of protection as the federal 
constitution.  Like our sister states, we conclude that the good or bad 
faith of the police in failing to preserve potentially useful evidence 
[semen stains that could have been tested for DNA] cannot be 
dispositive of whether a criminal defendant has been deprived of due 
process of law.  Accordingly, we, too, reject the litmus test of bad faith 
on the part of the police, which the United States Supreme Court 
adopted under the federal constitution in Youngblood. 
Id. at 594 n.20; see, e.g., Thorne v. Department of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331 
n.9 (Alaska 1989) (“We have construed the Alaska Constitution’s Due Process Clause 
to not require a showing of bad faith.”); State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 673 (Haw. 
1990) (bad faith test too restrictive because it precludes courts “in cases where no 
bad faith is shown, from inquiring into the favorableness of the evidence or the 
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of its loss”); Commonwealth v. 
Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 497 (Mass. 1991) (“The rule under the due process 
provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution is stricter than that stated in the 
Youngblood opinion.”); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 512 (W. Va. 1995) (“As a 
matter of state constitutional law, we find that fundamental fairness requires this 
Court to evaluate the State’s failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence in 
the context of the entire record.”); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 643 (Vt. 1994) 
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recognized an exception to the bad faith test where the evidence is so 
critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial without it 
“fundamentally unfair.”110  The court applied this exception in a toxic 
waste dumping prosecution where the sole evidence, the samples 
tested, was not preserved.  Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court 
rejected Youngblood and set forth a three-pronged analysis: (1) the 
degree of negligence or bad faith involved; (2) the importance of the 
missing evidence, considering the probative value and reliability of 
secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and (3) the 
sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to sustain the 
conviction.111 
The Youngblood test provides no incentive for police departments 
to adopt standard operating procedures that ensure the proper 
collection and preservation of evidence.  Larry Youngblood was later 
exonerated through DNA testing—after having spent nine years in 
prison.  Dr. Edward Blake, a DNA scientist, told a reporter: 
We now have before us a flawed legal precedent that stands on 
the shoulders of an innocent man. . . .  For those organizations 
that are poorly run or mismanaged or don’t give a damn, . . . the 
Youngblood case was a license to let down their guard and be lazy.  
The effect that had was generally to lower the standards of 
evidence collection.112 
C.  Barefoot v. Estelle 
Barefoot v. Estelle,113 a capital murder case decided by the Court in 
1983, is the case most closely related to Daubert.  In the penalty phase, 
 
(Youngblood decision “too narrow because it limits due process violations to only 
those cases in which a defendant can demonstrate bad faith, even though the 
negligent loss of evidence may critically prejudice a defendant”). 
 110 Ex parte Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Ala. 1992); see also Gurley v. State, 639 
So. 2d 557 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (failure to preserve murder victim’s wallet for 
defense testing violates state constitution). 
 111 Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 87 (Del. 1989).  The Hammond court did not 
foreclose the possibility of conviction despite the state’s failure to properly preserve 
evidence: 
We remain convinced that fundamental fairness, as an element of due 
process, requires the State’s failure to preserve evidence that could be 
favorable to the defendant “[to] be evaluated in the context of the 
entire record. . . .”  When evidence has not been preserved, the 
conduct of the State’s agents is a relevant consideration, but it is not 
determinative. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 112 Barbara Whiteaker, DNA Frees Inmate Years After Justices Rejected Plea, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11, 2000, at A12. 
 113 463 U.S. 880 (1983).  For a further discussion of Barefoot, see Giannelli, supra 
note 12. 
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the prosecution offered psychiatric testimony concerning Barefoot’s 
future dangerousness.114  One psychiatrist, Dr. James Grigson, without 
ever examining Barefoot, testified that there was a “‘one hundred 
percent and absolute’ chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of 
criminal violence.”115  Barefoot challenged the admission of this 
evidence on constitutional grounds due to its unreliability. 
In an amicus brief, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
stated that the “large body of research in this area indicates that, even 
under the best of conditions, psychiatric predictions of long-term 
dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of every three cases.”116  
In a later passage, the brief noted that the “unreliability of [these] 
predictions is by now an established fact within the profession.”117  A 
substantial body of research supported the APA position.118 
Nevertheless, the Court rejected Barefoot’s argument.  
According to the Court, “[n]either petitioner nor the [APA] suggests 
that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future 
dangerousness, only most of the time.”119  In another passage, the Court 
noted that it was “not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely 
unreliable and that the factfinder and the adversary system will not be 
competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its 
shortcomings.”120 
If this is a standard at all, it is an incredibly low one.  It permitted 
the admission of evidence, as one commentator noted, “at the brink 
of quackery”121—and, in a death penalty case.122  Justice Blackmun, the 
author of the Daubert opinion, dissented: 
 
 114 Future dangerousness was a qualifying factor under the Texas death penalty 
statute.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (West 1981) (requiring a 
jury finding that “there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society”). 
 115 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting from record). 
 116 Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 9, Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080). 
 117 Id. at 12. 
 118 See generally Charles Patrick Ewing, Preventive Detention and Execution: The 
Constitutionality of Punishing Future Crimes, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 139 (1991); 
Michael L. Radelet & James W. Marquart, Assessing Nondangerousness During Penalty 
Phases of Capital Trials, 54 ALB. L. REV. 845 (1990); Christopher Slobogin, 
Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984). 
 119 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901 (emphasis added). 
 120 Id. at 898-99 
 121 George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, “Dangerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony, and 
Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977). 
 122 On October 24, 1984, Thomas Barefoot was executed based on “junk science.”  
PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 220 (1991) 
(noting that one could favor the death penalty and “yet still recoil at the thought that 
a junk science fringe of psychiatry . . . could decide who will be sent to the gallows”). 
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In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for 
me.  One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, 
but when a person’s life is at stake . . . a requirement of greater 
reliability should prevail.  In a capital case, the specious testimony 
of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by 
the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words, 
equates with death itself.123 
In short, Daubert required a far higher standard of admissibility for 
money-damages than Barefoot required for the death penalty.  Nor 
can Barefoot be distinguished from Daubert as a constitutional, rather 
than an evidentiary, decision.124  The Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence has long proclaimed that “death is different”125 and 
imposed higher reliability standards.126 
D.  United States v. Scheffer 
United States v. Scheffer127 is in one sense the most difficult case to 
criticize.  In Scheffer, the Supreme Court upheld the military’s per se 
exclusionary rule of polygraph results in the face of a constitutional 
challenge.128  Given the state of polygraph research,129 the Court 
might have rested its decision on reliability grounds alone.130  
Nevertheless, even the unreliability argument is not without 
problems.  The most notable is the comparison with Barefoot.  The 
research on polygraph evidence is far more supportive than that on 
 
 123 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916. 
 124 One commentary points out that “Barefoot explicitly did not involve the Rules, 
but rather the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty based on questionable 
evidence.”  Bert Black & John A. Singer, From Frye to Daubert: A New Test for Scientific 
Evidence, 1 SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 19, 37 (July 1993). 
 125 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002) (“As Arizona’s counsel 
maintained at oral argument, there is no doubt that ‘[d]eath is different.’”). 
 126 E.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (“The finality of the death 
penalty requires ‘a greater degree of reliability’ when it is imposed.”) (quoting 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 
(1980) (Because the death penalty is different, the Court has “invalidated procedural 
rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination.”).  See 
also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“In capital 
cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not 
be required in other cases.”). 
 127 523 U.S. 303 (1998). 
 128 Id. at 313. 
 129 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 29-30 (2002) 
[hereinafter POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION].  Even here I have serious reservations 
about the Court’s treatment of the right to present a defense, as well as its attempts 
to distinguish Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284 (1973). 
 130 As discussed later, however, the Court based its holding on several distinct 
grounds. 
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“future dangerousness.”  Polygraph evidence easily satisfies the 
Barefoot test: not “always wrong . . . only most of the time.”  Keep in 
mind that the Court’s options were not limited to per se admission or 
exclusion.  The Court could have rejected the per se ban, as it did with 
hypnotically-refreshed testimony in Rock v. Arkansas,131 and left the 
issue to the states to develop alternative reliability standards, which 
had been the military court’s position.132  Such an approach would 
have probably resulted in what now exists in federal cases—trial court 
discretion that is typically exercised in favor of exclusion in the 
absence of a prosecution stipulation.133 
Moreover, the Court never confronted an issue raised by Justice 
Stevens in dissent134 and mentioned by Justice Kennedy in his 
concurring opinion.135  The very government that argued against 
 
 131 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding that prohibiting all hypnotically refreshed 
testimony violated the defendant’s right to testify on her own behalf but leaving open 
the possibility that exclusion on a case-by-case approach would be constitutional). 
 132 In Scheffer, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces had held that 
Military Rule 707’s per se exclusionary rule was unconstitutional as applied in that 
case.  In that court’s view: 
A per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to rebut 
an attack on his credibility, without giving him an opportunity to lay a 
foundation under Mil. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert, violates his Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense.  We limit our holding to 
exculpatory evidence arising from a polygraph examination of an 
accused, offered to rebut an attack on his credibility. 
Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 445 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
 133 E.g., Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
“unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Evidence 
Rule 403”); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A] 
privately commissioned polygraph test, which was unknown to the government until 
after its completion, is of extremely dubious probative value.”).  See also 1 GIANNELLI 
& IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 8.4(D). 
 134 Justice Stevens wrote: 
[T]o the extent that the use of the lie detector plays a special role in 
the military establishment, military practices are more favorable to a 
rule of admissibility than is the less structured use of lie detectors in the 
civilian sector of our society.  That is so because the military carefully 
regulates the administration of polygraph tests to ensure reliable 
results.  The military maintains “very stringent standards for polygraph 
examiners” and has established its own Polygraph Institute, which is 
“generally considered to be the best training facility for polygraph 
examiners in the United States.”  The military has administered 
hundreds of thousands of such tests and routinely uses their results for 
a wide variety of official decisions. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 323-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
 135 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated: 
I doubt, though, that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, and some later 
case might present a more compelling case for introduction of the 
testimony than this one does.  Though the considerable discretion 
given to the trial court in admitting or excluding scientific evidence is 
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polygraph evidence nevertheless spends millions of dollars each year 
running the Defense Polygraph Institute, sponsors research on the 
technique, and employs the technique both in and outside of the 
criminal system.136 
Perhaps to avoid these issues, the Court attempted to support its 
position with other rationales, none of which are very compelling.  
One rationale was that polygraph evidence would violate the ultimate 
issue prohibition.137  However, commentators have harshly criticized 
the ultimate issue rule,138 and both the Federal and Military Rules of 
Evidence have rejected the rule outright. 139  Should DNA evidence be 
excluded because it treads upon the “ultimate” issue in the case—the 
identity of the perpetrator?  Fingerprint comparisons?  Future 
dangerousness was an ultimate issue in Barefoot. 
Second, the majority cited the jury’s role in determining 
credibility.140  This argument needs further examination.  Assume the 
accused claims alibi and DNA evidence is admitted against him; the 
DNA evidence will undoubtedly reflect on the accused’s credibility, 
and yet no one would suggest DNA evidence is inadmissible on this 
ground.  The Court, of course, may have only been concerned with a 
“direct” comment on credibility.  But as one commentator noted: 
[T]he very fact that jurors possess common knowledge about 
credibility puts them in a good position to come to their own 
conclusions; they may therefore be more skeptical about an 
expert’s testimony on credibility than about testimony on a more 
esoteric issue, such as DNA profiling.  Some support for this 
contention comes from the studies of jury reactions to polygraph 
evidence, which have generally found that juries are not 
overwhelmed: they draw their own conclusions about credibility, 
 
not a constitutional mandate, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., . . . there is some tension between that rule and our holding today.  
And, as Justice Stevens points out, there is much inconsistency between 
the Government’s extensive use of polygraphs to make vital security 
determinations and the argument it makes here, stressing the 
inaccuracy of these tests. 
Id. at 318 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 136 See Giannelli, supra note 51. 
 137 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313-14 (“Jurisdictions, in promulgating rules of evidence, 
may legitimately be concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive weight to 
the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise and at time 
offering, as in respondents’ case, a conclusion of the ultimate issue in the trial.”). 
 138 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920, at 18 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (calling 
the rule “a mere bit of empty rhetoric”). 
 139 See FED. R. EVID. 704(a); MIL. R. EVID. 704. 
 140 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 (“By its very nature, polygraph evidence may diminish 
the jury’s role in making credibility determinations.”). 
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not always agreeing with the polygrapher’s verdict.141 
Finally, an additional red herring was offered to support the 
Scheffer holding: the avoidance of litigation on collateral issues that 
“prolong[] criminal trials and threaten[] to distract the jury from its 
central function of determining guilt or innocence.”142  Justice 
Holmes once explained this factor: “[S]o far as the introduction of 
collateral issues goes, that objection is a purely practical one—a 
concession to the shortness of life.”143  Weighed against this 
“consideration” is the constitutional right to present a defense, which 
the Court has described as a fundamental right: “The right to offer 
the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if 
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to 
present the defendant’s version of the facts. . . .  The [defendant] has 
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.  This 
right is a fundamental element of due process of law.”144  Thus, it 
seems rather breathtaking that such a “fundamental” right could be 
so easily trumped by a lack-of-time rationale.145  The admissibility of 
DNA evidence often consumes a lot of court time but “collateralness” 
was never cited as a major concern.146 
E.  Ake v. Oklahoma 
Painting this picture of the Supreme Court decisions would be 
unfair without mentioning Ake v. Oklahoma,147 in which the Court in 
1985 recognized for the first time an accused’s right to expert 
assistance.  Although Ake has often been interpreted narrowly,148 it 
 
 141 REDMAYNE, supra note 1, at 174. 
 142 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 314. 
 143 Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 943-44 (Mass. 1887). 
 144 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of 
the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.’”) (citations omitted). 
 145 See generally Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause: Unearthing 
Compulsory Process, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1275; Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Defense of the 
Right to Present Defense Expert Testimony: The Flaws in the Plurality Opinion in United 
States v. Scheffer, 69 TENN. L. REV. 539 (2002). 
 146 See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 168 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (“[H]earings 
were held for approximately six weeks.”); see also People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 
986 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (“This hearing took place over a twelve week period producing a 
transcript of approximately five thousand pages.”). 
 147 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 148 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
802 (6th ed. 2000) (“Generally speaking the courts have read Ake narrowly, and have 
refused to require appointment of an expert unless it is absolutely essential to the 
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remains a landmark case, and the Court deserves credit for 
recognizing this right.  Nevertheless, the Court has passed up many 
opportunities to strengthen Ake.  That case also stands in stark relief 
to permitting bogus evidence in death penalty cases (Barefoot), 
refusing to require the police to implement reasonable measures to 
ensure the safe handling of evidence (Youngblood), and turning a 
blind eye toward expert testimony lacking such a rudimentary basis as 
documentation (Fensterer). 
IV.  DAUBERT’S EFFECT IN CRIMINAL CASES 
As stated earlier, Daubert has had a far more significant impact in 
civil litigation than in criminal litigation.  That is not say, however, 
that its affect in criminal cases has been insubstantial.  Several 
significant developments in criminal prosecutions can be traced to 
Daubert, five of which are discussed in this section. 
A.  Reexamination of “Venerable” Techniques 
First, some federal courts have read the Daubert trilogy as inviting 
a “reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’ venerable, technical 
fields.”149  Attacks, some successful and some not, have been launched 
against handwriting evidence,150 hair comparisons,151 fingerprint 
 
defense.”) 
 149 United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999); see also United 
States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002) (“Courts are now 
confronting challenges to testimony, as here, whose admissibility had long been 
settled.”). 
 150 See Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 967.  Hidalgo thusly limited the introduction of 
expert handwriting evidence: 
Because the principle of uniqueness is without empirical support, we 
conclude that a document examiner will not be permitted to testify 
that the maker of a known document is the maker of the questioned 
document.  Nor will a document examiner be able to testify as to 
identity in terms of probabilities. 
Id.; see also United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) 
(“[Expert’s] bald assertion that the ‘basic principle of handwriting identification has 
been proven time and time again through research in [his] field,’ without more 
specific substance, is inadequate to demonstrate testability and error rate.”); United 
States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (D. Alaska 2001).  The Saelee court 
highlighted the relative lack of credible testing of handwriting identification 
methods: 
There is little known about the error rates of forensic document 
examiners.  The little testing that has been done raises serious 
questions about the reliability of methods currently in use.  As to some 
tasks, there is a high rate of error and forensic document examiners 
may not be any better at analyzing handwriting than laypersons.  This is 
illustrated not only in the Kam studies relied on by Mr. Cawley, but also 
in a series of proficiency tests carried out by Collaborative Testing 
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examinations,152 firearms identification,153 bitemarks,154 and 
 
Service under the supervision of the Forensic Sciences Foundation. 
Id.; see also United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 
(determining that expert testimony concerning Japanese handprinting was 
inadmissible and stating that: “Handwriting analysis does not stand up well under the 
Daubert standards.  Despite its long history of use and acceptance, validation studies 
supporting its reliability are few, and the few that exist have been criticized for 
methodological flaws.”); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly established that 
forensic document examination, despite the existence of a certification program, 
professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be 
regarded as ‘scientific . . . knowledge.’”).  But see United States v. Jolivet, 224 F.3d 
902, 906 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming admission of expert testimony that it was likely 
that defendant wrote the questioned documents and finding such opinion reliable 
because the expert was well-qualified in handwriting analysis and that his testimony 
“may be properly characterized as offering the jury knowledge beyond their own and 
enhancing their understanding of the evidence before them”); United States v. 
Prine, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (W.D. Wash. 2002).  See generally Andre Moenssens, 
Handwriting Identification Evidence In the Post-Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251 
(1997); D. Michael Risinger et al., Brave New “Post-Daubert World”—A Reply to Professor 
Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405 (1998). 
 151 See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okl. 1995) (“This 
court has been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair 
comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of Daubert.”), rev’d on this issue, 
Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the due 
process, not Daubert, standard applies in habeas proceedings); see also Paul C. 
Giannelli & Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 514 (2001) 
(discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was used to convict 
the innocent). 
 152 See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(excluding and then admitting fingerprint evidence); see also United States v. 
Martinez-Cintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D. P.R. 2001) (admitting evidence); 
United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (same), aff’d, 260 F.3d 
597 (7th Cir. 2001); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint 
“Science” Is Revealed, 75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 605, 628 n.122 (2002) (“Internal documents 
of the NIJ presently on file with the author . . . reveal that the Institute was ready to 
publish the Solicitation in September of 1999, but that at the FBI’s request, 
publication was delayed until after Mitchell’s trial.”).  See generally Jennifer Mnookin, 
Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001); Jessica M. 
Sombat, Note, Latent Justice: Daubert’s Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint 
Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819 (2002); David A. Stoney, Fingerprint 
Identification: The Scientific Basis of Expert Testimony on Fingerprinting Identification, §§ 27-
2.0 - 2.4, in 3 MODERN SCI. EVIDENCE (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002). 
 153 See United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(determining that ballistics evidence satisfies the Daubert standard); see also Joan 
Griffin & David J. LaMagna, Daubert Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Ballistics Next on 
the Firing Line, CHAMPION 20 (Sept.-Oct. 2002); Lisa J. Steele, “All we want you to do is 
confirm what we already know.” A Daubert Challenge to Firearms Identifications, 38 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 465 (2002). 
 154 See Howard v. State, 697 So. 2d 415, 429 (Miss. 1997).  The Supreme Court of 
Missippi wrote: 
While few courts have refused to allow some form of bite-mark 
comparison evidence, numerous scholarly authorities have criticized 
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intoxication testing.155  Such challenges would not have occurred 
under Frye.  The handwriting challenges triggered research on that 
subject156 as well as the establishment of standards157 and the 
curtailment of overstated conclusions in some cases.158  Moreover, 
there have been more legal articles on these subjects in the last few 
 
the reliability of this method of identifying a suspect. . . .  There is little 
consensus in the scientific community on the number of points which 
must match before any positive identification can be announced. . . .  
Suffice it to say that testimony concerning bite marks in soft, living 
flesh has not been scientifically accredited at this time. 
Id.; see also I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark Analyses—A 
Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85, 86 (2001) (“Despite the continued acceptance of 
bitemark evidence in European, Oceanic and North American Courts, the 
fundamental scientific basis for bitemark analysis has never been established.”). 
 155 See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 549 (D. Md. 2002).  As the 
court described it: 
The doctrine of judicial notice is predicated upon the assumption that 
the source materials from which the court takes judicial notice are 
reliable.  Where, as here, that reliability has been challenged, the court 
cannot disregard the challenge, simply because a legion of earlier court 
decisions reached conclusions based on reference to the same 
then-unchallenged authority. . . .  I cannot agree that the HGN, WAT 
and OLS tests, singly or in combination, have been shown to be as 
reliable as asserted by Dr. Burns, the NHTSA publications, and the 
publications of the communities of law enforcement officers and state 
prosecutors. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 156 E.g., Sargur Srihari et al., Individuality of Handwriting, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 856 
(2002) (1,500 individual handwriting samples scanned into a computer programmed 
to compare the samples based on a variety of features such as slant, height, number 
of interior contours, and number of vertical slope components; computer matched 
exemplars with a 98% accuracy rate); see also Moshe Kam et al., Writer Identification by 
Professional Document Examiners, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 778 (1997) (false positive rate for 
professionals was 6.5% compared to 38.3% for non-professionals); Moshe Kam et al., 
Writer Identification by Professional Document Examiners, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 778 (1997) 
(forensic document examiners demonstrated a false positive error rate of only .5%); 
Moshe Kam et al., Effects of Monetary Incentives on Performance of Non-Professionals in 
Document-Examination Proficiency Tests, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1000 (1998). 
 157 See United States v. Gricco, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7564, *19 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 158 See United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Neb. 2000).  
The court refused to allow the introduction of a handwriting experts testimony, 
stating: 
[T]he Court concludes that FDE Rauscher’s testimony meets the 
requirements of Rule 702 to the extent that he limits his testimony to 
identifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between 
the known exemplars and the questioned documents.  FDE Rauscher is 
precluded from rendering any ultimate conclusions on authorship of 
the questioned documents and is similarly precluded from testifying to 
the degree of confidence or certainty on which his opinions are based. 
Id.; accord United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002); United States 
v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999). 
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years than in the prior quarter century,159 which should mean closer 
scrutiny of this type of expert testimony for the foreseeable future.  
Whether lawyers have the ability and resources to challenge this 
testimony through cross-examination and the presentation of defense 
experts,  however, remains to be seen.  Even so, the forensic science 
community views these attacks as serious and is reforming.160 
B.  Closing the Frye Loophole 
Second, Daubert closed a major loophole in the Frye rule.  Many 
Frye courts recognize an exception for non-novel evidence, which 
exempts certain techniques from the general acceptance 
requirement.161  For example, California courts apply this exception 
to bitemark comparisons162 and evidence based on narcotic detection 
dogs.163  Similarly, Arizona courts use this exception to exempt 
footprint evidence164 and predictions of recidivism using actuarial 
models from close scrutiny.165  Daubert explicitly rejected this “free 
pass” to admissibility,166 and Kumho reinforced this view by subjecting 
 
 159 See supra notes 150-54. 
 160 See Graham R. Jones, President’s Editorial—The Changing Practice of Forensic 
Science, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 437, 437 (2002).  Jones pointed out the practical effects 
Daubert had: 
The Daubert Standard goes a step further than Frye and requires the 
forensic scientists to prove that the evidence is fundamentally 
scientifically reliable, not just generally accepted by his/her peers in 
the discipline.  Defense lawyers have also become more critical and 
aggressive in challenging forensic evidence and are more willing to 
hire qualified forensic experts to assist them. 
Id. 
 161 See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 1-5(D). 
 162 According to People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App. 1975), the Frye test 
“finds its rational basis in the degree to which the trier of fact must accept, on faith, 
scientific hypotheses not capable of proof or disproof in court and not even generally 
accepted outside the courtroom.”  Id. at 355-56.  The court went on to hold that bite 
mark evidence did not involve blind acceptance by the jury.  The basis on which the 
expert reached his conclusions—models, photographs, and X-rays—were shown to 
the trier of fact, and the expert’s conclusions were verifiable by the court.  Thus, the 
“court did not have to sacrifice its independence and common sense in evaluating” 
the evidence.  Id. at 357. 
 163 See People v. Sommer, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 173 (Ct. App. 1993) (determining 
that a narcotic detection dog was not subject to Frye). 
 164 See State v. Murray, 906 P.2d 542, 562 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc) (“Frye analysis is 
not applicable to footprint [comparisons].”). 
 165 See State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (“Based 
upon our understanding of Frye as interpreted by Logerquist, we conclude that the use 
of actuarial models by mental health experts to help predict a person’s likelihood of 
recidivism is not the kind of novel scientific evidence or process to which Frye 
applies.”). 
 166 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11 (“Although the Frye decision itself focused 
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all expert testimony to the reliability requirement. 
C.  Effect on Frye Standard 
Daubert’s affect on the Frye test has also been noteworthy.  Daubert 
has forced state courts to reexamine their admissibility standard for 
scientific evidence.  Although numerous courts have rejected Frye in 
favor of Daubert,167 some jurisdictions have retained Frye,168 and many 
of these are populous states, in which many, if not most, criminal 
cases are tried.  Some of these courts believe Frye offers greater 
protection for defendants than Daubert.169 
 
exclusively on ‘novel’ scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 
702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence.”); see also People v. 
Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 79 n.12 (Colo. 2001).  The Schrek court wrote: 
We decline to limit the applicability of CRE 702 to only the novel 
scientific evidence governed previously by Frye.  Nothing in the text of 
the rule requires such a limitation, and our holding is consistent with 
that of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert, which expressly 
applied its holding to all scientific evidence. 
 167 E.g., Shreck, 22 P.3d at 70.  As the Schreck court clarified: 
We now hold that CRE 702, rather than Frye, governs a trial court’s 
determination as to whether scientific or other expert testimony should 
be admitted.  Such an inquiry should focus on the reliability and 
relevance of the proffered evidence and requires a determination as to 
(1) the reliability of the scientific principles, (2) the qualifications of 
the witness, and (3) the usefulness of the testimony to the jury. 
Id.; see, e.g., Schafersman v. Agland Coop., 631 P.3d 862, 867 (Neb. 2001) (describing 
a veterinarian’s expert opinion on multiple mineral toxicity which alleged that cows 
were injured by contaminated feed).  “[W]e conclude that the framework for 
evaluating expert opinion testimony in Nebraska should no longer be guided by Frye, 
but should instead reflect the criteria set forth in Daubert and its progeny.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Other states that have explicitly adopted Daubert include Alaska, 
Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. See 1 GIANNELLI &  
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 1-13. 
 168 E.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1994) (The “Kelly formulation [of 
Frye under the Cal. Evid. Code] survived Daubert . . . .”); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 
721, 731 (Ill. 1996) (“Illinois follows the Frye standard for the admission of novel 
scientific evidence.”); Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65, 80 (Md. 1999) (Despite Daubert, 
“we have not abandoned Frye or Reed.”); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 
(Minn. 2000) (“Having reviewed the cases and the commentary surrounding this 
issue, we reaffirm our adherence to the Frye-Mack standard and reject Daubert.”).  
Other Frye jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington.  
See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 1-15. 
 169 See Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 843 (Fla. 2001).  The Florida Supreme 
Court asserted that: 
In keeping with the State’s burden in a criminal trial (i.e., the State 
must prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt), this Court has continued to use the Frye test when evaluating 
novel scientific evidence proposed by the State even though the United 
States Supreme Court, in a civil case, has adopted a different rule. 
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In addition, terms such as gatekeeper,170 testability, and peer 
review have crept into the Frye lexicon.  Ramirez v. State171 illustrates 
this development.  In Ramirez, the Florida Supreme Court rejected 
the testimony of five experts who claimed general acceptance for 
matching a knife with a cartilage wound in a murder victim—a type 
of “toolmark” comparison.  The court wrote: 
Although several of the State’s experts testified that the 
underlying principle employed by Hart [the examiner] is 
generally accepted in the field, we conclude that this testimony 
standing alone is insufficient to establish admissibility under Frye 
in light of the fact that Hart’s testing procedure possesses none of 
the hallmarks of acceptability that apply in the relevant scientific 
community to this type of evidence.172 
The court went on to note that the procedure had never been tested, 
“meaningful peer review” was lacking,173 the error rate had not been 
quantified, and objective standards had not been developed.  Ramirez 
represents a reinvigorated Frye test,174 and it is not alone.175 
 
Id; see also State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1314 (Wash. 1996) (en banc). The en 
banc court determined that: 
Where novel scientific evidence is at issue, the additional Frye inquiry 
allows the judiciary to defer to the scientists precisely where to do so 
recognizes both the need for admissibility of novel scientific evidence 
where it is sufficiently accepted, and the need to protect against novel 
scientific evidence which has not even gained general acceptance in 
the relevant field.  The trial court’s gatekeeper role under Frye involves 
by design a conservative approach, requiring careful assessment of the 
general acceptance of the theory and methodology of novel science, 
thus helping to ensure, among other things, that “pseudoscience” is 
kept out of the courtroom. 
Id. 
 170 See Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1314 (describing the “trial court’s gatekeeper role 
under Frye”). 
 171 810 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2001). 
 172 Id. at 849 (emphasis added). 
 173 The court described the deficiencies: 
The North American articles were written by law enforcement 
technicians and while several of those articles address principles 
related to Hart’s theory none undertakes the kind of searching, critical 
review that is the sine qua non of scientific acceptance.  The European 
articles, on the other hand, were written by medical doctors and 
professors and are far more discerning; they delineate general studies 
and contain extensive analyses.  The articles in that group, however, 
address only traditional knife mark theory relative to striation 
signatures.  None address Hart’s testing methodology and the absolute 
certainty of identification deduced from such a test. 
Id. at 850 (footnotes omitted). 
 174 Ramirez, 810 So. 2d at 844 (Fla. 2001).  The Florida Supreme Court stated: 
When applying the Frye test, a court is not required to accept a “nose 
count” of experts in the field.  Rather, the court may peruse disparate 
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D.  Effect on Relevancy Approach 
Daubert’s affect on the third approach to scientific evidence, the 
relevancy approach, may have been the most profound—and yet the 
least noticed.  Under this approach, qualifying the expert generally 
qualifies the technique employed by that expert.176  Barefoot illustrates 
this approach.177  This, of course, is a very lax standard,178 one which 
Daubert implicitly rejected by requiring reliability in addition to 
relevancy.179 
 
sources—e.g., expert testimony, scientific and legal publications, and 
judicial opinions—and decide for itself whether the theory in issue has 
been “sufficiently tested and accepted by the relevant scientific 
community.”  In gauging acceptance, the court must look to properties 
that traditionally inhere in scientific acceptance for the type of 
methodology or procedure under review—i.e., “indicia” or “hallmarks” 
of acceptability.  A bald assertion by the expert that his deduction is 
premised upon well-recognized scientific principles is inadequate to 
establish its admissibility if the witness’s application of these principles 
is untested and lacks indicia of acceptability. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 175 See Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1044 (Md. 2002) (excluding under Frye probability 
testimony concerning two children suffering sudden infant death snydrome (SIDS)). 
 176 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1250 (1980). 
 177 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 930.  “[T]he rules of evidence generally extant at the 
federal and state levels anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be 
admitted and its weight left to the factfinder, who would have the benefit of 
cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party.”  Id. at 889.  “We are 
not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable and that the 
factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and 
take due account of its shortcomings.”  Id. at 882. 
 178 Wisconsin still follows the relevancy approach.  See State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d 
867, 873 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding DNA evidence admissible).  Wisconsin follows 
neither Frye nor Daubert: “Once the relevancy of the evidence is established and the 
witness is qualified as an expert, the reliability of the evidence is a weight and 
credibility issue for the fact finder and any reliability challenges must be made 
through cross-examination or by other means of impeachment.”  Id.; see also State v. 
Donner, 531 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding intoxication test 
admissible).  The Donner court wrote: 
[B]efore Daubert, the Frye test was not the law in Wisconsin.  To that 
extent, Wisconsin law and Daubert coincide.  Beyond that, Wisconsin 
law holds that “any relevant conclusions which are supported by a 
qualified witness should be received unless there are other reasons for 
exclusion.”  Stated otherwise, expert testimony is admissible in 
Wisconsin if relevant and will be excluded only if the testimony is 
superfluous or a waste of time. . . .  Assuming that Daubert in its 
application represents something beyond Walstad, we observe that we . 
. . are bound to follow our supreme court case law. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 179 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that 
any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but 
reliable.”); see also Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (although 
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A number of courts had rejected Frye before Daubert was 
decided.180  Many of these courts now claim that Daubert is consistent 
with their former approach.181  This is true in some instances but not 
in others.182  Many of these jurisdictions had, in effect, adopted the 
relevancy approach, and their movement toward Daubert raises their 
standard of admissibility. 
E.  The “Third-prong” Controversy: Daubert “Plus” 
Finally, the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 can be traced to 
Daubert.183  It goes beyond Daubert and Kumho, however.184  The 
amendment, for instance, requires the proper application of the 
 
expert qualified, testimony rejected). 
 180 Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.  See 1 GIANNELLI 
& IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 1-14. 
 181 E.g., Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 294 (Ark. 1996) (“Daubert . . . adopted a 
reliability approach to Rule 702, comparable to the relevancy approach of Prater in 
which reliability is the critical element.”); Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 73 (Del. 1993) 
(“Our decisions [in prior cases] are consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Daubert.”); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993) (“Past decisions of this 
court have espoused similar sentiments [as Daubert] . . . .”); State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 
457, 471 (Mont. 1994) (“[T]he guidelines set forth in Daubert are consistent with our 
previous holding in Barmeyer concerning the admission of expert testimony of novel 
scientific evidence, and we, therefore, adopt the Daubert standard . . . .”); DiPetrillo v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 729 A.2d 677, 686 (R.I. 1999) (“Though we declined expressly to 
adopt the Daubert I standard, our previous cases have endorsed its principles.”). 
 182 See State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ohio 1983).  The Ohio position 
merely left the issue to trial judge “discretion”: 
[T]he Rules of Evidence establish adequate preconditions for 
admissibility of expert testimony, and we leave to the discretion of this 
state’s judiciary, on a case by case basis, to decide whether the 
questioned testimony is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 
Id. 
 183 The following was added to Rule 702 in December, 2000: “(1) the testimony is 
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case.”  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 184 See Rudd v. General Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336-37 (M.D. Ala. 
2001).  The district court noted that: 
[T]he new Rule 702 appears to require a trial judge to make an 
evaluation that delves more into the facts than was recommended in 
Daubert, including as the rule does an inquiry into the sufficiency of the 
testimony’s basis (“the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data”) 
and an inquiry into the application of a methodology to the facts (“the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of 
the case”).  Neither of these two latter questions that are now mandatory 
under the new rule . . . were expressly part of the former admissibility 
analysis under Daubert. 
Id. 
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technique in the particular case, thus settling the Frye-Daubert “plus” 
issue, at least in federal courts. 
This issue arose in the DNA cases where some courts had held 
that, because of the “complexity” of DNA analysis and its “powerful 
impact” on a jury, “passing muster under Frye alone is insufficient.”185  
Accordingly, a three-pronged analysis was adopted: (1) the 
underlying theory must have been generally accepted, (2) the 
procedures implementing the theory must have been generally 
accepted, and (3) the testing laboratory must have followed these 
procedures.  This third prong was labeled Frye “plus.”186  Some federal 
courts, in DNA187 and polygraph cases,188 applied this requirement 
after Daubert was decided—i.e., Daubert “plus.”  The issue was 
surprisingly controversial, but this requirement had been applied pre-
DNA and pre-Daubert189 and is found in virtually every intoxication test 
(DUI) statute in this country.  Nevertheless, the courts had split on 
the issue, with some holding that the application of proper 
procedures went to weight and not admissibility.190  Amended Rule 
 
 185 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1989). 
 186 See Stephanie B. Goldberg, A New Day for DNA?, 78 A.B.A. J. 84, 84 (1992) (“Frye 
Plus”). 
 187 E.g., United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993).  The 
Eighth Circuit wrote: 
We believe that the reliability inquiry set forth in Daubert mandates that 
there be a preliminary showing that the expert properly performed a 
reliable methodology in arriving at his opinion. . . .  In order to 
determine whether scientific testimony is reliable, the court must 
conclude that the testimony was derived from the application of a 
reliable methodology or principle in the particular case. 
Id. 
 188 In United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 881-82 (D.N.M. 1995), the court 
wrote: “It is not entirely clear whether Daubert requires as a prerequisite to 
admissibility that the proponent establish the validity of the specific application of a 
scientific technique.”  Id. at 880-81.  The court continued: 
[A]fter reviewing the case law addressing this issue in the context of 
other forensic laboratory techniques and after careful consideration of 
the testimony presented at the hearing regarding the polygraph 
technique, the Court holds that in the context of polygraph evidence, 
such scrutiny is imperative to a faithful application of Daubert. 
Id. at 882.  The court went on to rule “that in addition to establishing the scientific 
validity of the polygraph technique in the abstract, the proponent of the proposed 
testimony must also prove that the specific examination was conducted properly by a 
competent examiner.”  Id. 
 189 See United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (chromatographic 
analysis of ink).  “It is widely recognized that the party offering the results of 
laboratory tests must . . . vouch for its correct administration in the particular case.”  
Id. at 574. 
 190 See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, at 36 (listing cases involving 
polygraph, voiceprints, as well as other types of scientific evidence that adopt this 
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702 resolves this debate in favor of the more stringent approach. 
Furthermore, the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 702 
specified a number of reliability factors191 that supplement the ones 
enumerated in Daubert.192  One is whether the field of expertise 
claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results.  This 
provides some “official” support for challenges to entire fields of 
forensic science (e.g., fingerprints and hair comparisons).193 
 
position); see also State v. Lehr, 38 P.3d 1172, 1179 (Ariz. 2002) (“Finally, there needs 
to be a foundational showing that correct procedures were followed in a given case.  
This foundation is distinct from the Frye finding itself and, in the judge’s discretion, 
may initially be provided at trial in front of the jury rather than at a separate 
hearing.”). 
 191 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000).  The following factors 
may be relevant under Rule 702: whether the underlying research was conducted 
independently of litigation; whether the expert unjustifiably extrapolated from an 
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion; whether the expert has adequately 
accounted for obvious alternative explanations; whether the expert was as careful as 
she would be in her professional work outside of paid litigation; and whether the 
field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results.  Id. 
 192 In describing the trial judge’s screening or “gatekeeping function,” the Daubert 
Court identified a number of factors.  First, in evaluating reliability, a judge should 
determine whether the scientific theory or technique can be and has been tested.  
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.  Second, whether a theory or technique has been subjected 
to peer review and publication is “a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in 
assessing . . . scientific validity.”  Id. at 594.  Third, a technique’s “known or potential 
rate of error” is a pertinent factor.  Id.  Fourth, the “existence and maintenance of 
standards controlling the technique’s operation” are other indicia of trustworthiness.  
Id.  Finally, “general acceptance” remains an important consideration.  Id. 
 193 The federal amendment does not stand alone.  The amended Uniform Rule 
702 and several jurisdictions have codified reliability standards post-Daubert, although 
it is unclear whether this will result in more stringent standards.  See, e.g., HAW. R. 
EVID. 702 (“In determining the issue of assistance to the trier of fact, the court may 
consider the trustworthiness and validity of the scientific technique or mode of 
analysis employed by the proffered expert.”); IND. R. EVID. 702(b) (“Expert scientific 
testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the scientific principles upon 
which the expert testimony rests are reliable.”).  The Ohio evidence rule provides: 
To the extent that the testimony reports the result of a procedure, test, 
or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all the following apply: 
(1) the theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based 
is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted 
knowledge, facts, or principles; (2) the design of the procedure, test, or 
experiment reliably implements the theory; and (3) the particular 
procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way that will yield an 
accurate result. 
OHIO R. EVID. 702(C).  The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d 
831 (Tenn. 2000), announced: 
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 is more stringent than its federal 
counterpart.  As a matter of contrast, while Fed. R. Evid. 702 requires 
only that the evidence “assist the trier of fact,” Tenn. R. Evid. 702 
requires that expert testimony “substantially assist the trier of fact. . . .”  
This distinction indicates that the probative force of the testimony 
must be stronger before it is admitted in Tennessee. 
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V.  OTHER INFLUENTIAL FACTORS 
Daubert is only a part of the picture, however.  There are at least 
two other formative influences that should be considered. 
A.  DNA Evidence 
The advent of DNA evidence has also shaped the course of 
forensic science in significant ways.  The DNA admissibility “wars”194 
highlighted the need for valid protocols195 and proficiency testing,196 
and commentators soon began asking why such procedures were not 
applied in other forensic fields.197 
More importantly, the research scientists who testified as experts 
in the DNA cases (for both the prosecution and defense) came from 
a “scientific” culture, unlike the many forensic examiners who work 
in crime laboratories and are sometimes described as “cops in lab 
coats.”  The DNA scientists were comfortable with quality control 
procedures, demanded written protocols, viewed proficiency testing 
as a positive development, and believed in open science and “not trial 
by ambush.”198  All this was new to forensic science, which had grown 
 
Id. at 834 (citations omitted).  The Michigan rule predated Daubert.  See MICH. R. 
EVID. 702 (allowing expert testimony only if based on “recognized” scientific, 
technical, or other knowledge). 
 194 See William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification 
Tests: Lessons From the “DNA War”, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993). 
 195 Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371 
NATURE 735, 735 (Oct. 27, 1994).  Lander and Budowle pointed out: 
The initial outcry over DNA typing standards concerned laboratory 
problems: poorly defined rules for declaring a match; experiments 
without controls; contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy 
interpretation of autoradiograms.  Although there is no evidence that 
these technical failings resulted in any wrongful convictions, the lack of 
standards seemed to be a recipe for trouble. 
Id. 
 196 DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 83, at 55(“No laboratory should let its results 
with a new DNA typing method be used in court, unless it has undergone such 
proficiency testing via blind trials.”). 
 197 See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting” Can Teach 
the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 372 (1991).  After 
reviewing DNA evidence, Saks and Koehler concluded that: 
[F]orensic scientists, like scientist in all other fields, should subject 
their claims to methodologically rigorous empirical tests.  The results 
of these tests should be published and debated.  Until such steps are 
taken, the strong claims of forensic scientist must be regarded with far 
more caution than they traditionally have been. 
Id. 
 198 See United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1969) (“[The] course of the 
government smacks too much of a trial by ambush, in violation of the spirit of the 
[discovery] rules.  A new trial is required, with a fair opportunity for the defense to 
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to maturity in an adversarial environment.199  The spillover effect of 
DNA profiling on forensic science has been substantial. 
B.  Scientific Abuse Cases 
DNA technology had another unexpected fallout.  It exonerated 
the wrongfully convicted, and in the process, the causes of these 
convictions were brought into the sunlight.  In their book, Actual 
Innocence, Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer examined 
sixty-two DNA exonerations secured through Cardozo Law School’s 
Innocence Project to ascertain what factors contributed to these 
miscarriages of justice; one of the more startling conclusions was that 
a third of these cases involved “tainted or fraudulent science.”200  This 
reinforced prior disclosures of expert abuse.201  Fred Zain was the 
most notorious,202 but he was not alone; cases in Oklahoma City203 and 
Montana204 are currently under investigation. 
 
run its own neutron activation tests of the material . . . .”). 
 199 See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 109  (1991).  “Forensic scientists present opinions and conclusions without 
research.  They fail to test the accuracy and reliability of their work until questions 
are raised by others . . . .”  Id. at 148.  “All available information indicates that 
forensic science laboratories perform poorly. . . .  Current regulation of clinical labs 
indicates that a regulatory system can improve crime laboratories.”  Id. at 191. 
 200 SCHECK ET AL., supra note 21, at 246. 
 201 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need 
for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POLICY & L. 439 (1997); see also David 
Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123 
(1996) (discussing cases in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and England). 
 202 Zain was Chief Serologist for ten years in West Virginia.  In reviewing a judicial 
report on Zain’s misconduct, the West Virginia Supreme Court spoke of “shocking 
and egregious violations,” “corruption of our legal system,” and “mock[ing] the ideal 
of justice under law.”  The report by the judge states: 
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating the 
strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on 
individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of 
genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that 
multiple items of evidence had been tested, when only a single item 
had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) 
repeatedly altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create 
the erroneous impression that genetic markers had been obtained 
from all samples tested; (8) failing to report conflicting results; (9) 
failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve 
conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when testing 
supported only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting 
scientifically impossible or improbable results. 
In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 
501, 503 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting report). 
 203 Jim Yardley, Oklahoma Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Used by Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 2001, at A1. 
 204 See Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y. 
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The Inspector General’s 1997 report on the FBI laboratory 
demonstrated the extent of the problem.205  This investigation found 
inaccurate testimony, testimony beyond the competence of 
examiners, insufficient documentation of test results, scientifically 
flawed reports, inadequate record management and retention, and 
failures of management to resolve serious and credible allegation of 
incompetence.  The report’s recommendations are revealing because 
they are so basic.  They include: (1) seeking accreditation of the FBI 
laboratory by the American Society of Crime Laboratory 
Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board; (2) requiring examiners 
in the Explosives Unit to have scientific backgrounds in chemistry, 
metallurgy, or engineering; (3) mandating the preparation and 
signing of separate reports instead of having one composite report 
“without attribution to individual examiners”; (4) establishing report 
review procedures by unit chiefs; (5) preparing adequate case files to 
support reports; (6) monitoring court testimony in order to preclude 
examiners from testifying to matters beyond their expertise or in ways 
that are “unprofessional”; and (7) developing written protocols for 
scientific procedures. 
These disclosures have had an impact.  By 2001, the Florida 
Supreme Court felt compelled to note: 
In order to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system in 
Florida, particularly in the face of rising nationwide criticism of 
forensic evidence in general, our state courts—both trial and 
appellate—must apply the Frye test in a prudent manner to cull 
scientific fiction and junk science from fact.  Any doubt as to 
admissibility under Frye should be resolved in a manner that 
minimizes the chance of a wrongful conviction, especially in a 
capital case.206 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Daubert has irrevocably altered the paradigm for the admissibility 
of expert testimony.  While there have been several reforms, much 
remains to be done.  First, basic scientific research is needed.  Many 
forensic techniques gained judicial acceptance before demanding 
standards were required.  Only the federal government—the FBI and 
National Institute of Justice—have the resources to fund this 
research.  The actual research, however, needs to be done outside 
 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24 (discussing hair evidence in the trial of Jimmy Ray 
Bromgard, who spent 15 years in prison before being exonerated by DNA). 
 205 FBI LABORATORY, supra note 87. 
 206 Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 853 (Fla. 2001) (citations omitted). 
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forensic science.207  It should be done by independent organizations 
such as the National Academy of Sciences,208 which has conducted 
studies on voiceprints,209 DNA,210 polygraph,211 and comparative bullet 
lead analysis.212 
The need for independent review is illustrated by the DNA 
experience.  In November 1991, Professor Seymour Geisser, a 
statistician at the University of Minnesota, submitted a critical paper 
 
 207 See REDMAYNE, supra note 1, at 25.  Redmayne noted the limitations of 
publishing in forensic journals: 
Details of [a] new technique might be published, but this will be in a 
limited range of journals—Science and Justice, Journal of the Forensic 
Sciences, Forensic Science International—that probably does not get read 
much outside the forensic science community.  Publication here 
obviously counts for something, but it is usually only when a technique 
becomes controversial that the wider scientific community—including, 
sometimes, those best placed to judge its validity—will take an interest 
in it. 
Id; see also United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  
Starzecpyzel made a similar observation: 
The next Daubert factor is peer review and publication.  FDEs publish in 
several journals, including the Journal of Forensic Sciences, the 
International Journal of Forensic Sciences, and the International 
Journal of Forensic Document Examiners.  Only a handful of articles in 
these journals were brought to the Court’s attention that speak to 
issues of the reliability of forensic document examination.  In 
scrutinizing these articles, the Court found them to be significantly 
different from scholarly articles in such fields as medicine or physics, in 
their lack of critical scholarship. 
Id; see also United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (D. Alaska 2001).  In 
Saelee, the court explained that an: 
[Expert] offered a four-page list of published and unpublished articles 
dealing with handwriting analysis.  According to Mr. Cawley, these 
articles are written by forensic document examiners, and the published 
articles are presented at professional meetings for peer review.  
However, Mr. Cawley also testified that he did not know whether any of 
the articles discussed error rates, empirical testing, or coincidental 
matches, although he claimed to have read the articles.  The list, 
without analysis of the substance of the articles, is of little use to the 
court.  The court infers that most of the listed articles were written by 
proponents of the guild style (apprentice training) process of training 
handwriting examiners. 
Id. 
 208 See 36 U.S.C.A. § 150303 (2001) (“On request of the United States 
Government, [the Academy] shall . . . investigate, examine, experiment, and report 
upon any subject of science or art . . . .”). 
 209 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE 
IDENTIFICATION (1979). 
 210 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996); 
DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 83. 
 211 See POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION, supra note 129. 
 212 This report is scheduled for release in the fall of 2003. 
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on the forensic use of DNA statistics to the American Journal of Human 
Genetics.  The Journal asked Professor Geisser to obtain permission 
from the FBI to use their original data rather than the data submitted 
by the FBI to defense attorneys.  Geisser then requested permission 
from Dr. Budowle, the FBI’s top DNA scientist.  James Kearney, head 
of the Forensic Science Research at the FBI, informed Geisser that 
(1) the FBI had made commitments earlier to other scientists 
(Chakraborty, Devlin, Risch, and Weir) and his study must not 
conflict with their studies, (2) the FBI data may be used only in a 
joint collaboration with Dr. Budowle, (3) the use of the data was 
restricted to this one paper, and (4) all authors must agree to the 
entire contents of a final manuscript prior to submission to a journal.  
Geisser believed that: 
an independent study under such provisions would be totally 
compromised, if not impossible. . . .  By the way, Chakraborty, 
Devlin, Risch and Weir have all published articles based on the 
FBI databases without Budowle as a co-author.  Recently, I 
analyzed Cellmark databases for a court in Ann Arbor, Michigan.  
At the insistence of Cellmark, the prosecutor requested that the 
judge rule that I not be allowed to submit my analysis of their data 
for publication.  So much for open science!213 
Second, the improvement of expert testimony in criminal cases 
depends on better crime laboratories.214  They should be regulated215 
as in New York216 and Oklahoma.217  Labs need to be subjected to a 
rigorous accreditation process; the American Society of Crime 
Laboratory Directors’ program is a good start.218  Individual 
examiners need to undergo certification, a process that should 
 
 213 Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci., Committee on Scientific Freedom & 
Responsibility, 5 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS REPORT 2 (1992). 
 214 See Nick Madigan, Houston’s Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at A20 (reporting that operations were suspended in December 
2002 after an audit found numerous problems). 
 215 See Eric Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505 (1989) (“At 
present, forensic science is virtually unregulated – with the paradoxical result that 
clinical laboratories must meet higher standards to be allowed to diagnose strep 
throat than forensic labs must meet to put a defendant on death row.”). 
 216 N.Y. EXEC. § 995-b (McKinney 2003). 
 217 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37. 
 218 See Smith v. State, 702 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind. 1998) (DNA).  The Smith court 
acknowledged the importance of accreditation: 
[T]he lab was accredited by the American Society of Crime Lab 
Directors in 1990.  Furthermore, the lab runs its tests under controlled 
conditions, follows specific protocols, and conducts quality testing on 
the kits and the analysts.  Any concerns in this respect go to the weight 
of the evidence, not its admissibility. 
Id; see also Commonwealth v. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d 739, 743 n.9 (Mass. 1997) (DNA). 
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include credible proficiency testing,219 continuing education, and re-
certification.  Finally, standardization of laboratory procedures, 
including written protocols are needed.220  All this requires money in 
an area where the underfunding of crime labs is chronic.221 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Daubert has evolved into a stringent standard in civil cases.  
Paradoxically, and perhaps shamefully, this standard has not been 
consistently imposed in criminal cases.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly missed opportunities to require more exacting 
standards in the use of scientific evidence in criminal prosecutions.  If 
the government is not willing to do the necessary validation research, 
 
 219 In fingerprint cases, a British fingerprint examiner with twenty-five years 
experience at New Scotland Yard testified that the FBI proficiency tests were nearly 
fraudulent: “It’s not testing their ability.  It doesn’t test their expertise.  I mean I’ve 
set these tests to trainees and advanced technicians.  And if I gave my experts these 
tests, they’d fall about laughing.”  United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 
558 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 220 See State v. Jones, 541 S.E.2d 813  (S.C. 2001).  In Jones, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court observed that: 
Kennedy has compared the insole impressions made in some 200 
Canadian army boots with the feet of the wearers.  He began research 
in the area in 1989 after earlier work done by Dr. Louise Robbins was 
discredited.  Kennedy testified that different researchers use different 
methods in making these type comparisons, but that he felt his method 
(the one used by Agent Derrick) was the best. . . .  Here, there was no 
written protocol in existence when Agent Derrick conducted his 
testing, much less one which had been subjected to SLED’s quality 
control policies 
Id. at 818, 819; see also United States v. Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 809, 810 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(voicegram analysis rejected).  The Eighth Circuit noted that: 
[The expert] conceded that the method he used was not in accordance 
with the standards of the International Association for Identification.  
It is true, as defendant points out, that there are other organizations in 
the field, with other standards, but Mr. De Vir did not testify that the 
methods he used conformed to any recognized standards. 
Id. 
 221 In 1967, President Johnson’s Crime Commission noted that “the great majority 
of police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and lack highly 
skilled personnel able to use the modern equipment now being developed.”  
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 235 (1967).  In 1974, President Nixon’s Crime 
Commission commented: “Too many police crime laboratories have been set upon 
budgets that preclude the recruitment of qualified, professional personnel.”  NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE 304 (1974).  
A report on Washington State crime labs revealed that a “staggering backlog of cases 
hinders investigations of murder, rape, arson, and other major crimes.”  Tomas 
Fuillen & Eric Nalder, Overwhelming Evidence: Crime Labs in Crisis, SEATTLE TIMES, Jun. 
19, 1994, at A1, A14. 
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exclusion of evidence may be the only option.222  Citing the “best 
evidence” principle,223 a British commentator has asserted: 
[W]hen expert evidence is excluded owing to reliability concerns, 
the proponent may be able to improve the quality of the evidence 
in the future. This is most obvious when the proponent is the 
state, which is in a good position to carry out further research on 
a technique or theory.224 
 
 222 See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., 
dissenting) (“The government has had ten years to comply with Daubert.  It should 
not be given a pass in this case.”). 
 223 Professor Nance has argued against the conventional wisdom that posited jury 
control as the underlying rationale for evidentiary rules, a position put forth by 
Thayer and endorsed by McCormick.  Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 
IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988).  Nance claimed that litigant control was a better 
explanatory theory—that is, the exclusion of some types of evidence is intended to 
require litigants to produce “better evidence.” 
 224 REDMAYNE, supra note 1, at 126. 
